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NOTE
CATEGORIZING CATEGORIES: PROPERTY OF
THE ESTATE AND FRAUDULENT
TRANSFERS IN BANKRUPTCY
Michael R. Cedillos*
11 U.S.C. § 541 defines "property of the estate" in bankruptcy, but
courts have not interpreted that section uniformly. The Fifth Circuit
has read the term broadly to include both interests in property that
the trustee recovers under § 541(a)(3) and legal or equitable inter-
ests under § 541(a)(1) that have purportedly been fraudulently
transferred but which the trustee has not yet recovered. The Second
Circuit, however, has taken a more restrained approach, holding
that fraudulently transferred property that the trustee has not yet
recovered does not constitute property of the estate. This Note ar-
gues that courts should adopt the Second Circuit's restrained
approach to "property of the estate." Canons of construction indi-
cate that fraudulently transferred property is "property of the
estate" only once the trustee has recovered it. Moreover, although
the Fifth Circuit's expansive approach to § 541 attempts to equita-
bly protect creditors, including fraudulently transferred property as
"property of the estate" prior to its recovery is problematic for the
administration of bankruptcy proceedings, potentially clouding title
to property of the estate and thereby contravening bankruptcy's
twin goals of giving the debtor afresh start and efficiently and eq-
uitably distributing the debtor's property to its creditors.
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INTRODUCTION
A key portion of the general Bankruptcy Title, 11 U.S.C. §541,
defines "property of the estate."' This section includes a long list of property
interests, including both equitable and legal interests and causes of action,2
"wherever located and by whomever held."3 As present concerns about the
real estate market and potential mortgage foreclosures lead us into uncer-
tain times, defining what qualifies as "property of the estate" is of
particular import. Indeed, as more of the credit extended to borrowers
turns into debt to be discharged in bankruptcy, having a clear sense of
what is properly "property of the estate"-the property that the bankruptcy
trustee or debtor-in-possession4 distributes on behalf of the debtor's credi-
tors-will become increasingly important. Such a definition is by no
means clear under current interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code.
In In re MortgageAmerica Corp.,' the Fifth Circuit read § 541's defini-
tion of "property of the estate" expansively to include not only "[a]ny
1. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2000). Section 541 reads, in relevant part:
§ 541. Property of the estate
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301,302, or 303 of this title creates an estate. Such
estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
(2) All interests of the debtor and the debtor's spouse in community property as of the
commencement of the case that is-
(A) under the sole, equal, or joint management and control of the debtor; or
(B) liable for an allowable claim against the debtor, or for both an allowable claim
against the debtor and an allowable claim against the debtor's spouse, to the ex-
tent that such interest is so liable.
(3) Any interest in property that the trustee recovers under section 329(b), 363(n), 543,
550, 553, or 723 of this title.
Id.
2. Id. § 541(a)(1), (2)(B); see also S. REP. No. 95-989, at 83 (1978), as reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868. The Senate Report provides the following:
Under paragraph (I) of subsection (a), the estate is comprised of all legal or equitable interest
of the debtor in property, wherever located, as of the commencement of the case. The scope of
this paragraph is broad. It includes all kinds of property, including tangible or intangible prop-
erty, causes of action ....
S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82.
3. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a).
4. Although this Note refers only to the bankruptcy trustee, Chapter II debtors-in-
possession have the same rights as the trustee. Id. § 1107(a).
5. Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.),
714 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1983).
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interest in property that the trustee recovers" under § 541(a)(3) 6 but also
legal or equitable interests under § 541(a)(1) that have purportedly been
fraudulently transferred but which the trustee has not yet recovered.7 Imput-
ing to the debtor an equitable interest in purportedly fraudulently transferred
property was well intentioned: the Fifth Circuit wanted to prevent debtors
from skirting the law and to protect creditors' interests even though the trus-
tee had not yet recovered the property.' The Fifth Circuit has confirmed its
approach in subsequent cases.9
Meanwhile, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected In re MortgageAmerica
Corp.'s statutory analysis in favor of a more restrained approach. It held that
fraudulently transferred property that the trustee has not yet recovered does
not constitute property of the estate under § 541(a)(1).' ° In so doing, the court
followed In re Saunders," a Florida Bankruptcy Court decision. The Fourth
Circuit has highlighted the circuit split, with at least one of its lower courts
approving of the Second Circuit's approach."2
While this particular distinction may seem esoteric, including purportedly
fraudulently transferred property as property of the estate prior to its recovery
is significant because it generates uncertainty regarding whether a trustee can
properly distribute such property to a debtor's creditors. This uncertainty can
wreak havoc on the bankruptcy process by clouding title to the property and
prolonging the process. Such a result contravenes bankruptcy's twin goals of
giving the debtor a fresh start and efficiently and equitably distributing the
debtor's property to its creditors. The Fifth Circuit's approach admirably seeks
to prevent debtors from skirting the law and to protect creditors' interests;
however, the resulting uncertainty makes the court's expansive approach to
property of the estate more trouble than it is worth.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3).
7. In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d at 1275; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (stating
that property of the estate includes "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case").
8. In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d at 1275.
9. See, e.g., Cullen Ctr. Bank & Trust v. Hensley (In re Criswell), 102 F.3d 1411, 1417 (5th
Cir. 1997); Sherk v. Tex. Bankers Life & Loan Ins. Co. (In re Sherk), 918 F.2d 1170, 1175-76 (5th
Cir. 1990); S.I. Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway Delivery Serv. (In re S.I. Acquisition, Inc.), 817 F.2d
1142, 1149-50 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1987).
10. FDIC v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1992).
11. 101 B.R. 303 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989); see also, e.g., Dunes Hotel Assocs. v. Hyatt Corp.,
245 B.R. 492, 504 (D.S.C. 2000); United States v. Alfano, 34 F. Supp. 2d 827, 841 (E.D.N.Y 1999);
Bank Brussels Lambert v. Credit Lyonnais (Suisse) S.A., 192 B.R. 73, 76 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Corpo-
rate Food Mgmt., Inc. v. Suffolk Cmty. Coll. (In re Corporate Food Mgmt., Inc.), 223 B.R. 635, 643
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998).
12. In re French, 440 F.3d 145, 151 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006) (noting that "[t]he circuits are divided as
to whether 'property of the estate' encompasses property that a debtor has fraudulently transferred" and
that while "the Fifth Circuit's conclusion that 'property of the estate' includes property that could be,
but has not yet been, recovered," the Second Circuit and other courts "have concluded that property
held by third-party transferees only becomes 'property of the estate' after it has been avoided and re-
covered"); Dunes Hotel Assoc. v. Hyatt Corp., 245 B.R. 492, 504 (D.S.C. 2000) (finding "sound"
creditor reliance on In re Colonial Realty and In re Saunders for the proposition that "[u]ntil a judi-
cial determination has been made that the property was, in fact, fraudulently transferred, it is not
property of the estate" (quoting In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989)).
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This Note argues that courts should adopt the Second Circuit's restrained
approach to "property of the estate" and hold that § 541 does not include
fraudulently transferred property that the trustee has not yet recovered. Part I
provides background and describes key cases dealing with the interaction be-
tween property of the estate and fraudulent conveyances. Part H argues that
§ 541's language and structure strongly suggest that fraudulently transferred
property is property of the estate only after it has been recovered. Finally, Part
IH maintains that, while the Fifth Circuit's expansive approach to "property of
the estate" attempts to equitably protect creditors, including fraudulently
transferred property as "property of the estate" prior to its recovery has the
potential to cloud title to property of the estate. Part HI concludes that such a
result is problematic in terms of bankruptcy administration and that policy
concerns also argue against including in the estate fraudulently transferred
property that the trustee has not yet recovered.
I. THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING § 541
Courts disagree over the interpretation of § 541 and the definition of
"property of the estate."'3 This Part discusses the two seminal cases addressing
the issue of including purportedly fraudulently transferred property as
property of the estate prior to the trustee's recovery of such property: In re
MortgageAmerica Corp. ' 4 and In re Colonial Realty Co.'5 Determining the
effect each decision has on the bankruptcy process and the extent to which
each decision conforms to the most plausible reading of the statute requires
an understanding of the reasoning behind each of these decisions and the
statutory text upon which the courts relied.
Sections 548 and 550 allow the trustee to make a claim on property
transferred by the debtor under certain circumstances. Section 548 allows
the trustee to avoid any transfer of an "interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation ... incurred by the debtor" that meets certain criteria on or
within two years of filing for bankruptcy protection. 6 The trustee may avoid
13. See, e.g., In re Colonial Realty Co., 980 F.2d 125; In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714
F.2d 1266. This Part discusses both cases in greater depth.
14. In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d at 1275 (holding that § 541 broadly includes
property that a debtor has allegedly fraudulently transferred but which the trustee has not yet recov-
ered).
15. In re Colonial Realty Co., 980 F.2d at 131 (reaching the opposite conclusion from In re
MortgageAmerica Corp. and holding that fraudulently transferred property that the trustee has not
yet recovered does not constitute property of the estate).
16. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (2000). Section 548 reads, in relevant part:
§ 548. Fraudulent transfers and obligations
(a) (1) The trustee may avoid any transfer ... of an interest of the debtor in property, or
any obligation ... incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within 2
years before the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or invol-
untarily-
(A) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after
1408 [Vol. 106:1405
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transfers the debtor made with "actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
entity to which the debtor was or became ... indebted."'7 However, a trans-
feror need not voluntarily create a fraudulent transfer for the trustee to be
able to avoid the transfer.'" The trustee may also avoid transfers and obliga-
tions for which the debtor "received less than a reasonably equivalent value
in exchange"' 9 and that were made while the debtor was insolvent,0 that left
the debtor with an unreasonably small amount of capital for his business
dealings,2' that the insolvent debtor intended to be or believed "would be
beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured, 22 or that benefited
an insider under an employment contract.23
Once a trustee has avoided a transfer under § 548, she may recover the
property under 11 U.S.C. § 550.24 Section 550 requires the transferee to
the date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, in-
debted; or
(B) (i) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and
(ii) (I) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such
obligation was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such trans-
fer or obligation;
(I1) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage
in business or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the
debtor was an unreasonably small capital;
(Il) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts
that would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured;
or
(IV) made such transfer to or for the benefit of an insider, or incurred
such obligation to or for the benefit of an insider, under an employ-
ment contract and not in the ordinary course of business.
II U.S.C. § 548 (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2000).
18. Id. § 548(a)(1) (allowing the trustee to avoid the transfer whether the debtor acted "vol-
untarily or involuntarily").
19. Id. § 548(a)(l)(B)(i).
20. Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(I).
21. Id. § 548(a)(I)(B)(ii)(I).
22. Id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IIl).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(l)(B)(ii)(IV) (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Note, however, that § 548(c)
provides an exception for bona fide purchasers and good faith givers of value. Id. § 548(c).
24. 11 U.S.C. § 550 (2000). Section 550 reads, in relevant part:
§ 550. Liability of transferee of avoided transfer
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a transfer is avoided
under section ... 548 ... of this title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the
estate, the property transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such prop-
erty, from-
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit such
transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
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disgorge the property received or its equivalent value and to return it to the
§ 541 "estate," the general pot from which all creditors are paid.26 Property
recovered under § 550 is therefore property of the estate under § 541(a)(3).17
The transferee can then attempt to recover the property through the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. But because the trustee manages the property pot for the
28benefit of all creditors, the disgorging transferee will likely receive at the
end of the bankruptcy proceeding less than what the trustee forced him to
return to the estate.29 Transferees whose transactions are subject to attack by
a bankruptcy trustee under § 548, often creditors, thus have an incentive to
fight the trustee's assertion of authority and to keep the property out of the
§ 541 bankruptcy estate.
In In re MortgageAmerica Corp.,3 the Fifth Circuit held that purport-
edly fraudulently transferred property under § 548 qualifies as property of
the estate under § 541(a)(1) even prior to its recovery by the trustee. The
court reasoned that
[t]he transferee may have colorable title to the property, but the equitable
interest-at least as far as the creditors (but not the debtor) are con-
cemed-is considered to remain in the debtor so that creditors may attach
or execute judgment upon it as though the debtor had never transferred it."
In In re MortgageAmerica Corp., Joe R. Long was the sole shareholder
of RJF, Inc., which in turn was the sole shareholder of MortgageAmerica• 32
Corporation. Previously, American National Bank of Austin had filed suit
and received a $192,554.40 judgment against MortgageAmerica in Texas
3
state court for breach of contract. The bank then attempted to collect on
that judgment from Long personally, rather than from his insolvent
company, on the grounds that Long was personally liable for the company's
obligations because he had deliberately stripped MortgageAmerica of assets
25. Id. § 550(a).
26. See id. § 541.
27. Id. § 541(a)(3) (including as property of the estate "[any interest in property that the
trustee recovers under section 329(b), 363(n), 543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title").
28. Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.),
714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir. 1983). Note, however, that not all transferees are creditors. For exam-
ple, a business owner may transfer business assets to his son, to whom the businessman owes no
money.
29. By definition, fraudulent and preferential transfers require that the transferee has re-
ceived more than he or she otherwise would have under bankruptcy proceedings. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 547(b), 548. Therefore, in the example from note 28, the non-creditor son would get nothing at
the end of the bankruptcy proceeding. Nonetheless, an event such as the debtor winning the lottery
or landing a profitable business deal after a creditor-transferee has already disgorged the funds may
enable the creditor-transferee to receive at the end of bankruptcy proceedings more than he or she
initially had received via the avoided transfer.
30. 714 F.2d 1266.
31. Id. at 1275.
32. Id. at 1268.
33. MortgageAmerica Corp. v. Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin, 651 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App. 1983).
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to benefit himself while defrauding the company's creditors.34 Specifically,
American National alleged that Long made three fraudulent transfers
in May and June 1981 totaling $2.3 million.35  By August 1981,
MortgageAmerica had entered into involuntary bankruptcy under Chapter 7,
which provides for liquidation of the company's assets.
American National argued that the causes of action against Long for
the purportedly fraudulent transfers did not constitute property of
MortgageAmerica's estate.37 The bank wanted all its money back; it did not
want the money to get into the hands of the bankruptcy trustee. If
MortgageAmerica "owned" the causes of action against Long and those
causes of action constituted property of the estate, the bankruptcy trustee
would be responsible for both the suit and the division among all creditors
of any property recovered.38 But if the causes of action against Long
belonged to American National, they would not constitute property of the
estate. American National could thus try to remove the automatic stay under
11 U.S.C. § 362"9 and move forward in pursuit of a judgment against Long
that it would not have to share. However, the Fifth Circuit ruled against
American National and held that the causes of action against Long were
property of MortgageAmerica's estate under § 541(a)(1).4 0 The court applied
the stay under § 362(a)(3), preventing American National from pursuing its
state court action against Long.4'
In addition, the court held that fraudulently conveyed and recoverable
property remains property of the estate despite the fact that the trustee has
not yet recovered it.42 The court reasoned that "it makes the most sense to
consider the debtor as continuing to have a 'legal or equitable interest[' in
the property fraudulently transferred within the meaning of section
541(a)(1). '4 3 Therefore, the trustee need not recover the debtor's equitable
interest because it "remain[s] in the debtor so that creditors may attach or
34. In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d at 1268.
35. Id.
36. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (2000).
37. In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d at 1268 ("The bank's principal argument on this
appeal is that under state law the three causes of action in issue all accrue solely to creditors in their
individual capacities, not to the company, and that these particular causes of action thus cannot be
considered 'property of the estate'....").
38. Id. at 1275 (noting that the trustee "acts for the benefit of all creditors, not just those who
win a race to judgment" (citing 4B COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, 70.71, at 788-89 (James W. Moore
ed., 14th ed. 1978))).
39. The automatic stay prevents creditors from pursuing most kinds of suits for recovery
against the bankrupt or the property of his or her estate. See 11 U.S.C. § 362.
40. In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d at 1275.
41. Id. at 1277-78.
42. Id. at 1277.
43. Id. at 1275 (alteration in original).
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execute judgment upon it as though the debtor had never transferred it."44
The Fifth Circuit's decision allowed the trustee to consider the purportedly
fraudulently transferred property as part of the estate without having to re-
cover it under § 548's fraudulent transfer provision. As a result, American
National could not bring suit to recover the property on its own.
In the face of criticism of In re MortgageAmerica Corp., the Fifth Circuit
sought to affirm its position in In re Criswell . In re Criswell relied heavily on
both In re MortgageAmerica Corp.46 and Begier v. IRS,47 a Supreme Court
case that-like In re Criswell-dealt with "property of the debtor" under
48§ 547, the preferential transfer statute. While recognizing that the phrase
"property of the debtor" under § 547 is notably different from "property of the
estate" under § 541, 9 the Begier court turned to § 541 for guidance on the
grounds that it serves as "the postpetition analog to § 547(b)'s 'property of the
debtor.' " It held that "'property of the debtor' subject to the preferential
transfer provision [of § 547(b)] is best understood as that property that would
have been part of the estate had it not been transferred before the commence-
ment of bankruptcy proceedings."5' In evaluating § 547(b), Begier noted that
§ 541(a) includes all of the debtor's legal or equitable interests in property as
of the commencement of the case." Although this statement is merely axio-
matic, the court in In re Criswell cited Begier, along with an Eighth Circuit
case and a bankruptcy case from the Eastern District of Virginia,53 for a differ-
ent proposition: that § 547(b)'s "interest of the debtor in property" is
"synonymous with the term 'property of the estate' under § 541."" The In re
Criswell court then applied In re MortgageAmerica Corp.'s principles to the
44. Id. at 1275 (emphasis added) ("The transferee may have colorable title to the property,
but the equitable interest . .. is considered to remain in the debtor so that creditors may attach or
execute judgment upon it as though the debtor had never transferred it." (emphasis added)).
45. Cullen Ctr. Bank & Trust v. Hensley (In re Criswell), 102 F.3d 1411 (5th Cir. 1997).
46. In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d 1266; see In re Criswell, 102 F.3d at 1418 ("In
sum, we hold, relying on Begier, on the other property definition cases, and on MortgageAmerica,
that ... the term 'interest of the debtor in property' under § 547(b) includes 'all legal or equitable
interests of the debtor as of the commencement of the case' .....".(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)
(2000))).
47. Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53 (1990).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 547. Section 547 is similar to § 548 in that § 547 deals with transfers subject
to avoidance and recovery by the trustee; however, § 547 deals with preferential transfers instead of
fraudulently transferred property.
49. Begier, 496 U.S. at 58-59.
50. Id. at 59; see also id. at 59 n.3.
51. Id. at58.
52. Id. at 59 (citing II U.S.C. § 541(a)(1)).
53. Cullen Ctr. Bank & Trust v. Hensley (In re Criswell), 102 F.3d 1411, 1416 (5th Cir.
1997) (citing Bergquist v. Anderson-Greenwood Aviation Corp. (In re Bellanca Aircraft Corp.), 850
F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1988), and Gen. Office Furniture Wholesalers, Inc. v. U.S. Furniture Indus., Inc.
(In re Gen. Office Furniture Wholesalers, Inc.), 42 B.R. 232 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984)).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
55. In re Criswell, 102 F.3d at 1416.
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facts of the case, holding that In re MortgageAmerica Corp.'s conclusion-
that courts should consider the debtor as retaining an equitable interest that
qualifies as property of the estate under § 541(a)(1) in property purportedly
fraudulently transferred under § 548-applies equally to purportedly prefer-
ential transfers under § 547(b)." However, even if Begier stands for the
proposition for which the Fifth Circuit cited it, neither Begier's nor In re
Criswell's interpretation of § 547(b) can be dispositive of § 548's meaning
or its relationship to § 541. Thus, despite the court's efforts, In re Criswell
never justifies In re MortgageAmerica Corp.57
In re Colonial Realty Co. sets out the competing proposition that fraudu-
lently transferred property does not constitute property of the estate before
its recovery.58 Prior to In re Colonial Realty Co., the Second Circuit had
cited In re MortgageAmerica Corp. with approval. 9 In In re Colonial Realty
Co., however, instead of following In re MortgageAmerica Corp.'s lead and
focusing on who owned a cause of action for fraudulently transferred prop-
erty-the debtor or the creditors-the Second Circuit focused on the target
of the lawsuit: the debtor in its capacity as the party alleged to have fraudu-
lently transferred property.6°
In In re Colonial Realty Co., the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC") appealed the bankruptcy court's ruling that its lawsuit to recover
fraudulently conveyed property was property of the estate and therefore sub-
ject to the automatic stay of 11 U.S.C. § 362.61 In the 1980s, Colonial Realty
Company had been involved in the formation and syndication of a number of
real estate limited partnerships.62 When the company (along with its general
partners Jonathan Googel and Benjamin Sisti) entered involuntary bankruptcy
in September 1990, thousands of investors suffered huge losses and creditors'
63
claims totaled billions of dollars. These losses caused the failure of severalbanks that had loaned money to Colonial. The FDIC acted as receiver for five
56. Id. at 1417 ("[Wlhen a soon-to-be-bankrupt debtor (like Criswell) fraudulently transfers
property to shield it from his creditors, that debtor/transferor should be considered to have retained
an equitable interest in the property so that it will continue to be considered 'property of the es-
tate.' ").
57. See id. at 1417 n.27 ("Even though a Second Circuit decision, In re Colonial Realty Co.,
has criticized part of our reasoning, the MortgageAmerica decision remains binding precedent in
this circuit." (citation omitted)).
58. FDIC v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1992).
59. Id. at 131 (citing In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. (Crysen/Montenay Energy Co. v.
Esselen Assocs., Inc.), 902 F.2d 1098, 1101 (2d Cir. 1990); St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v.
Pepsico, Inc., 884 F.2d 688, 696-97 (2d Cir. 1989); Cumberland Oil Corp. v. Thropp, 791 F.2d
1037, 1042 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); Mitchell Excavators, Inc. v. Mitchell,
734 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir. 1984)).
60. See id. (rejecting In re MortgageAmerica Corp.'s analysis despite having previously
cited the case with approval); see also infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
61. In re Colonial Realty Co., 980 F.2d at 129-30.
62. Id. at 127.
63. Id.
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of these banks between January and September 1991. 64 In this role, the FDIC
sought to avoid the transfer of and to recover approximately $10 million that
Sisti allegedly had fraudulently transferred to his wife and another company.65
Like American National in In re MortgageAmerica Corp., the FDIC asserted
that the state law cause of action belonged exclusively to the FDIC as re-
ceiver and that it was neither property of the estate nor subject to the
66
automatic stay. Meanwhile, the trustee argued that the court should follow
In re MortgageAmerica Corp. and hold that the transferred property was
property of the estate, even though the trustee had not yet recovered it, sub-
jecting the property to the automatic stay.
The Second Circuit concluded that, while In re MortgageAmerica Corp.
reached the correct result in staying the suit, the Fifth Circuit had analyzed the
• • 68
statute inappropriately. The In re Colonial Realty Co. court reasoned that
considering fraudulently transferred property to be property of the estate un-
der § 541(a)(1) prior to its recovery would render § 541(a)(3) superfluous. In
other words, including fraudulently transferred property under § 541(a)(1)
prior to its recovery on the grounds that the debtor retained an equitable inter-
est in the property renders § 541 (a)(3)-which makes any interest in property
that the trustee recovers property of the estate-"meaningless with respect to
property recovered pursuant to fraudulent transfer actions. 69
The In re Colonial Realty Co. court's analysis relied heavily on a Northern
District of Florida bankruptcy court decision, In re Saunders, that rejected In
re MortgageAmerica Corp.'s broad approach.70 In In re Saunders, creditor
Professional Savings Bank ("Professional") sought to recover funds that the
debtor had allegedly transferred for the purpose of hindering, delaying, or
defrauding creditors.' The trustee in In re Saunders relied on the broader In
re MortgageAmerica Corp. approach and asserted that the transferred assets
were still property of the estate. 72 However, the In re Saunders court dis-
agreed with In re MortgageAmerica Corp.'s conclusion, finding it
inconsistent with other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code because it would
render § 541 (a)(3) "meaningless with respect to property recovered pursuant
to fraudulent transfer actions., 73 The court also noted that applying the In re
MortgageAmerica Corp. principle would create problems with respect to
64. Id.
65. Id. at 127-28.
66. Id. at 130.
67. Id. at 131.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 131 (quoting In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989)).
70. See In re Colonial Realty Co., 980 F.2d at 131 (citing In re Saunders, 101 B.R. at 305).
71. In re Saunders, 101 B.R. at 303; see also 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A) (2000).
72. hI re Saunders, 101 B.R. at 304. The trustee also relied on S.L Acquisition, Inc. v. Eastway
Delivery Service, Inc. (In re SI. Acquisition, Inc.), 817 F.2d 1142 (5th Cir. 1987), but hI re S.1. Acquisi-
tion, Inc. followed the In re MortgageAmerica Corp. line of reasoning and is not particularly distinct
for these purposes.
73. In re Saunders, 101 B.R. at 305.
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other aspects of bankruptcy practice. For example, if courts could hold that
purportedly fraudulently transferred property is property of the estate prior
to a judicial determination that it was in fact fraudulently transferred, the
trustee could circumvent the statutes of limitations under various sections
providing for recovery of property]5 Thus, the In re Saunders court held-
and the Second Circuit in In re Colonial Realty Co. agreed-that purport-
edly fraudulently transferred property is not property of the estate until a
court determines it was fraudulently transferred.76
II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION AND REALIZING § 541's PURPOSE
While the Fifth and Second Circuits both lay out plausible arguments for
their respective interpretations of § 541, this Part argues that various canons
of statutory interpretation support the Second Circuit's conclusion in In re
Colonial Realty Co. Section II.A argues that the plain meaning of the stat-
ute's language indicates that courts should define "property of the estate"
narrowly. Although § 541 makes room in "property of the estate" for fraudu-
lently transferred property, such property is allowed only upon recovery.
Section II.B demonstrates that the Fifth Circuit's broad reading of § 541
violates the rule against surplusage by obviating two key portions of the
Bankruptcy Code, § 548 and § 550. Because the structure and language of
the statute indicate Congress's likely intention to define "property of the
estate" narrowly, the Fifth Circuit's attempt to draw not-yet-recovered prop-
erty into the "property of the estate" through the general language of
§ 541(a)(1) is ultimately inappropriate.
A. The Plain Meaning Approach
A plain meaning reading of the statute's language counsels against the
Fifth Circuit's interpretation of § 541. Indeed, the "golden rule" of statutory
interpretation is that interpreters should "adhere to the ordinary meaning of
the words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that ... leads to
any manifest absurdity or repugnance."77 The Fifth Circuit's expansive ap-
proach holds that "[t]he transferee may have colorable title to the property,
but the equitable interest ... is considered to remain in the debtor so that
74. Id. at 304-05.
75. Id. at 305. In In re Saunders, the court stated that
[u]ntil a judicial determination has been made that the property was, in fact, fraudulently trans-
ferred, it is not property of the estate. If it were, the trustee could simply use a turnover action
under II U.S.C. § 542, and the two (2) year statute of limitations of § 546(a) for actions under
§§ 544 and 548 could be avoided.
Id.
76. Id.; FDIC v. Hirsch (In re Colonial Realty Co.), 980 F.2d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing
In re Saunders, 101 B.R. at 305).
77. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES
AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 829 (3d ed. 2001) (quoting Becke v. Smith, (1836) 150 Eng.
Rep. 724, 726 (Exch. Div.)).
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creditors may attach or execute judgment upon it as though the debtor had
never transferred it. ' 78 However, this approach runs afoul of the golden rule
because it strains the plain meaning of two key terms: "equitable interest"
and "recovers."
A plain reading of § 541(a)(1) demonstrates that purportedly fraudu-
lently transferred property does not constitute an "equitable interest" that
belongs to the estate. An equitable interest is one either "held by virtue of an
equitable title or claimed on equitable grounds, such as the interest held by a
trust beneficiary.' 79 An equitable title is one "that indicates a beneficial in-
terest in property and that gives the holder the right to acquire formal legal
title."80 However, the trustee cannot satisfy the requirements of equitable
title with respect to purportedly fraudulently transferred property without an
adjudication that the property has been fraudulently transferred in the first
place. Title is the "union of all elements (as ownership, possession, and cus-
tody) constituting the legal right to control and dispose of property; the legal
link between a person who owns property and the property itself.""' These
elements of title are precisely those that are in dispute when a trustee alleges
that the debtor fraudulently transferred property. Therefore, the debtor can-
not have an equitable interest in purportedly fraudulently transferred
property on the grounds that the debtor has equitable title unless the court
makes a judicial determination that the property was fraudulently trans-
ferred.
No equitable grounds exist for considering the debtor as retaining an eq-
uitable interest in purportedly fraudulently transferred property because
there is an adequate remedy at law. Equity involves "recourse to principles
of justice to correct or supplement the law as applied to particular circum-
,,82
stances. Although equitable interests themselves are property of the estate
under § 541(a)(1), there is no reason for the courts to consider the debtor as
having an equitable interest83 in the purportedly fraudulently transferred
property for reasons of fairness or justice because the combination of
§§ 548, 550, and 541(a)(3) provides a sufficient remedy.84 That is, courts
78. Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.),
714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir. 1983).
79. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 829 (8th ed. 2004).
80. Id. at 1523.
81. Id. at 1522.
82 Id. at 579.
83. See In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d at 1275 ("The transferee may have colorable
title to the property, but the equitable interest ... is considered to remain in the debtor so that credi-
tors may attach or execute judgment upon it as though the debtor had never transferred it."
(emphasis added)).
84. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES (3d ed. 2002). Laycock notes
that "[i]t is hornbook law that equity will not act if there is an adequate remedy at law," id. at 370,
and that, while the rule may "no longer ha[ve] much bite," id. at 8, practitioners must "argue within
the terms of traditional doctrine" because no court has explicitly repudiated it and even a "successful
argument within the terms of the rule does not necessarily mean that plaintiff will get the remedy
she prefers," id. at 382.
1416 [Vol. 106:1405
Categorizing Categories
need not apply equitable principles to purportedly fraudulently transferred
property because the law has already provided an adequate remedy to ad-
dress title of such property under §§ 548, 550, and 541(a)(3)."
Likewise, Congress's use of verb tense in § 541(a)(3) undermines the
Fifth Circuit's broad interpretation of § 541(a)(1). Verb tense is generally
86
significant in construing statutes, and the Bankruptcy Code is no excep-
tion. 7 While courts have dealt with the issue of verb tense and its impact on
statutory analysis principally in non-bankruptcy cases,8" the Bankruptcy• • • 89
Code uses various tenses to draw important distinctions. For example, the
Bankruptcy Code's definitional section "defines a 'disinterested person' as a
person that, among other things, 'is not and was not an investment banker
for any outstanding security of the debtor.'"9 Other subsections of § 101
also make temporal distinctions. 9'
Section 541(a)(3)'s reference to property that the trustee "recovers"
9 2
denotes Congress's intent to include as property of the estate any property
that has been or will be fully recovered, but not property that the trustee
merely "might recover." Unless the context indicates otherwise, words used
in the present tense in any Act of Congress include the future as well as the
present tense.93 But the present and future tenses here-"recover" and "will
85. See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923) ("That a suit in equity does not lie
where there is a plain, adequate and complete remedy at law is so well understood as not to require
the citation of authorities."); Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U.S. 119, 124 (1892) ("The question here
involved is a dispute about title. The plaintiff has a full, adequate and complete remedy at law, and
the case is not one for the jurisdiction of a court of equity.").
86. United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 333 (1992) (holding that sentencing credit may
not be applied in the case at bar because "[b]y using these verbs in the past and present perfect
tenses [in the statute at issue], Congress has indicated that computation of the credit must occur after
the defendant begins his sentence"); United States v. Valentine, 63 F.3d 459, 463 (6th Cir. 1995)
("Congress' use of a verb tense is significant in construing statutes." (quoting Wilson, 503 U.S. at
333)).
87. Bank Brussels Lambert v. Coan (In re AroChem Corp.), 176 F3d 610, 623 (2d Cir.
1999).
88. See, e.g., Wilson, 503 U.S. at 333 (criminal sentencing guidelines); Valentine, 63 F.3d at
463 (misappropriation of city property); Hughes v. Bd. of Architectural Exam'rs, 952 P.2d 641, 649
(Cal. 1998) (architectural licensing); Martin v. City of Albany, 880 P.2d 926, 930 (Or. 1994) (work-
ers' compensation benefits); State v. Root, 123 P.3d 281, 284 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (drug possession).
89. See In re AroChem Corp., 176 F.3d at 623 (citing Wilson, 503 U.S. at 333).
90. In reAroChem Corp., 176 F.3d at 623 (quoting II U.S.C. § 101(14)(B) (2000)).
91. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101 (21A) (defining "farmout agreement" as one in which an owner
"agrees or has agreed"); id. § 10 1(26) (defining "forward contract merchant" partially based upon a
"right, or interest which is presently or in the future becomes"); id. § 101(53B)(A)(ii)(l) (defining
"swap agreement" to include a temporal agreement that "has been, is presently, or in the future
becomes").
92. Id. § 541(a)(3).
93. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the
context indicates otherwise ... words used in the present tense include the future as well as the
present .... ).
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recover," respectively-do not encompass the concept of "might recover."94
That is, the fact that a bankruptcy court may ultimately render a decision in
favor of the trustee is not the same as the court actually deciding; a trustee's
filing suit to recover property under § 548 on Monday is not the same as the
court's adjudication on Friday that the property was fraudulently transferred
and is property of the estate. 9 Thus, the Fifth Circuit's failure to adhere to
the statute's plain meaning by imputing unsaid language runs afoul of the
golden rule.
B. The Rule Against Surplusage
The Fifth Circuit's reading of § 541 violates the rule against surplusage
because it obviates § 548. While the canons of statutory interpretation are
not binding on a court,9 6 courts should give statutory provisions meaning,
rather than "emasculat[ing]" them.97 Therefore, a court must read a statute's
words in their context and with a view to their place in the general statutory
construct.98 Whenever possible, courts must construe statutes to give effect
to every word, clause, and sentence99 because "no provision should be con-
strued to be entirely redundant."' °
The language of § 541 distinguishes the debtor's legal and equitable in-
terests from fraudulently transferred property. Section 541(a)(3) specifically
includes as property of the estate "[a]ny interest in property that the trustee
recovers" under various sections of the Code.' °' Section 541(a)(1) separately
provides that property of the estate shall include "all legal or equitable inter-
ests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case."''0 2 The
Fifth Circuit's approach includes property the trustee "might recover" as
94. Equating "might recover" with "recover" or "will recover" would render § 548 surplu-
sage, allowing the trustee to avoid § 548's two-year statute of limitations and creating uncertainty in
the bankruptcy process. See infra notes 101- 107 and accompanying text.
95. Transfers not meeting § 548's criteria are not subject to avoidance and therefore the
trustee cannot recover them. See, e.g., Morris v. Midway S. Baptist Church (In re Newman), 183
B.R. 239, 246 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1995) (noting that § 548(a) allows the trustee to recover any transfer
that meets its criteria).
96. Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 85 (2001) ("[Tjhe canons of [statutory]
interpretation... do not determine how to read this statute. First, the canons are guides that need not
be conclusive.").
97. United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) ("The cardinal principle of
statutory construction is to save and not to destroy. It is our duty to give effect, if possible, to every
clause and word of a statute, rather than to emasculate an entire section .... ".(citations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
98. Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809 (1989); see also Owasso Indep. Sch.
Dist. No. 1-011 v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 434 (2002) (citing Davis, 489 U.S. 803).
99. TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citing Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174
(2001)); see also Menasche, 348 U.S. at 538-39 ("It is our duty 'to give effect, if possible, to every
clause and word of a statute'...." (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152 (1883))).
100. ESKRIDGE, supra note 77, at 833 (quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 778
(1988)).
101. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(3) (2000).
102. Id. § 541(a)(1).
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"legal or equitable interests" under subsection (a)(1). But legal and equitable
interests under subsection (a)(I) do not require an adjudication of recover-
ability; they are already part of the estate "as of the commencement of the
case."'' 3 The trustee cannot recover an equitable interest because it never left
the debtor's possession in the first place.'O° Under the Fifth Circuit analysis,
then, the trustee would not need to attempt a recovery of fraudulently trans-
ferred property at all, let alone complete one.105
Thus, following the Fifth Circuit's approach would relegate § 548 to
mere surplusage. If fraudulently transferred property automatically qualifies
as property of the estate under § 541(a)(1), the trustee has no need for either
§ 548106 or § 550"° even though Congress specifically provided such guide-
lines and made room in the estate for such recovered property under
§ 541(a)(3). As noted previously, property recovered under §§ 548 and 550
falls under § 541(a)(3).' °5 Section 548 allows the trustee to avoid fraudulent
transfers that meet certain criteria on or within two years of the debtor's
filing for bankruptcy protection. °9 Once a trustee has avoided a transfer un-
der § 548, the trustee may recover the property under § 550, which has its
own one-year statute of limitations."0 Property recovered under § 550 within
that time period is property of the estate under § 541(a)(3)."' However, the
Fifth Circuit's expansive reading of § 541(a)(1), which includes purportedly
fraudulently transferred property as property of the estate under subsection
(a)(1) without the need for an adjudication in favor of the trustee under § 548,
renders both §§ 548 and 550 surplusage by obviating the need to use them to
bring the property into property of the estate under subsection (a)(3).
103. Id.
104. Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica Corp.),
714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir. 1983) ("The transferee may have colorable title to the property, but
the equitable interest ... is considered to remain in the debtor so that creditors may attach or exe-
cute judgment upon it as though the debtor had never transferred it." (emphasis added)).
105. See, e.g., In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989). In In re Saunders,
the court noted that
[ujntil a judicial determination has been made that the property was, in fact, fraudulently trans-
ferred, it is not property of the estate. If it were, the trustee could simply use a turnover action
under II U.S.C. § 542, and the two (2) year statute of limitations of § 546(a) for actions under
§§ 544 and 548 could be avoided.
Id.
106. See II U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (allowing the trustee to avoid transfers made within two years
before the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition). In certain situations, the statute of limita-
tions can be extended to ten years. Id. § 548(e).
107. See id. § 550(0(1) ("An action or proceeding under this section may not be commenced
after the earlier of-(I) one year after the avoidance of the transfer on account of which recovery
under this section is sought; or (2) the time the case is closed or dismissed.").
108. See supra notes 16-29 and accompanying text.
109. I1 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1).
110. See id. § 550(0.
11. Id. § 541(a)(3) (including as property of the estate "[a]ny interest in property that the
trustee recovers under section 329(b), 363(n), 543, 550, 553, or 723 of this title").
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Moreover, even if § 541(a)(1) were to include fraudulently transferred
property prior to its recovery, purportedly fraudulently transferred property
cannot become property of the estate as an equitable interest under
§ 541(a)(1) until ajudge makes a formal finding that the property still belongs
to the debtor."2 But for it to "make sense" for the debtor to retain an equitable
interest in the purportedly fraudulently transferred property, the court must
assume that the debtor actually fraudulently transferred the property."3 Given
that Congress has provided § 548 and prescribed methods for its use, and
given that the bankruptcy judge determining whether the debtor fraudulently
transferred the property essentially makes the same determination as under
§ 548 even under the Fifth Circuit's approach,' "4 courts should use the method
for recovering fraudulently transferred property that Congress provided.
Otherwise, § 548 is rendered surplusage.
Congress's use of a separate subparagraph for the inclusion of trustee-
recovered property-§ 541(a)(3)--demonstrates its intent that courts not
consider such property to be property of the estate until the trustee has fully
recovered it."5 To hold otherwise makes § 548 and § 550 meaningless be-
cause the trustee could simply declare the property to be property of the
estate under § 541(a)(1) instead of using § 548 and § 550 to bring the prop-
erty within § 541(a)(3). That is, if § 541(a)(1) includes purportedly
fraudulently transferred property even without an adjudication in favor of
the trustee under § 548 followed by recovery under § 550, §§ 548 and 550
are surplusage because the trustee gets to include property that falls under
those sections without actually having to use them. Because the Fifth Cir-
cuit's approach violates the rule against surplusage, that court's attempt to
draw not-yet-recovered property into "property of the estate" through the
general language of § 541(a)(1) is inappropriate.
112. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 82 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5868
(conditioning the inclusion of equitable interests under § 541(a)(1) on whether "the property recov-
ered was merely out of the possession of the debtor, yet remained 'property of the debtor'").
Although the Bankruptcy Code does not define "property of the debtor," the Supreme Court has held
that § 541 is property of the debtor's "postpetition analog." Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 58-59
(1990); see also supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
113. See Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica
Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that "it makes the most sense to consider the
debtor as continuing to have a 'legal or equitable interest[]' in the property fraudulently transferred"
even though the court made no formal adjudication that the property was actually fraudulently trans-
ferred (alteration in original)).
114. See id. at 1277 ("Property fraudulently conveyed and recoverable . . . remains, despite
the purported transfer, property of the estate [as an equitable interest] within ... section 541(a)(1)
....."). By this reasoning, in order for the court to consider the debtor as continuing to have an equi-
table interest in the property, it must also consider whether the property was fraudulently
transferred. The difficulty with the Fifth Circuit's position in In re MortgageAmerica Corp. is that
the court never actually holds that the property was fraudulently transferred before attributing to the
debtor an equitable interest in it and including it as property of the estate.
115. See In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989) ("[Tihe inclusion of
property recovered by the trustee pursuant to his avoidance powers in a separate definitional sub-
paragraph clearly reflects the congressional intent that such property is not to be considered
property of the estate until it is recovered."); see also FDIC v. Hirsch (hi re Colonial Realty Co.),
980 F.2d 125, 131 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing In re Saunders, 101 B.R. at 305).
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III. AVOIDING PRACTICAL AND LEGAL PROBLEMS UNDER § 541
Although the Fifth Circuit's approach to "property of the estate" seeks to
equitably protect creditors, this Part argues that the courts should reject it
because including fraudulently transferred property as "property of the es-
tate" prior to its recovery potentially clouds title to that property. Such a
result is problematic in terms of bankruptcy administration. By encouraging
certainty regarding title to the property of the estate, the Second Circuit's
approach better serves the main goals of bankruptcy: to efficiently and equi-
tably distribute the debtor's property and to provide the debtor with a fresh
start.
The Fifth Circuit's decision to impute an equitable interest to the debtor
in a situation involving a purportedly fraudulent transfer is well intentioned
insofar as it prevents debtors from skirting the law and protects creditors'
interests. The court approached the problem of fraudulent transfer from the
creditors' point of view, finding that the transferee "may have colorable title
to the property, but the equitable interest-at least as far as the creditors (but
not the debtor) are concerned-is considered to remain in the debtor so that
creditors may attach or execute judgment upon it as though the debtor had
never transferred it.""16 In light of its chosen perspective, the Fifth Circuit
decided that it "makes the most sense" to consider the debtor as having a
legal or equitable interest in the purportedly fraudulently transferred prop-
erty and to include it as property of the estate under § 541(a)(1) even though
the trustee has not yet recovered the property.' 17
Allowing a trustee to exercise authority over property that has not been
recovered, however, conflicts with the main purposes of the Bankruptcy Act
and creates administrative problems for both the trustee and the creditors.
The Bankruptcy Code serves two main purposes: one equitable and the
other rehabilitative. First, the Code attempts to distribute the debtor's re-
maining assets to its creditors both efficiently and equitably."9 Since the
Bankruptcy Act's landmark enactment in 1898, the aim of the Act and its
subsequent incarnations has been to provide for the conservation of the
debtor's estate and for an equitable distribution of assets. 2° Second, the
116. In re MortgageAmerica Corp., 714 F.2d at 1275.
117. Id.
118. Westmoreland Human Opportunities, Inc. v. Walsh, 246 F.3d 233, 251 (3d Cir. 2001)
(citing Andrews v. Riggs Nat'l Bank of Wash., D.C. (In re Andrews), 80 E3d 906, 909 (4th Cir.
1996)).
119. Westmoreland, 246 E3d at 251 (citing City of New York v. Quanta Res. Corp., 739 F2d
912, 915 (3d Cir. 1984)). This concept is not new, however, as cases as far back as 1849 recognize
pro rata distribution of the debtor's property to be the main purpose of the Bankruptcy Act. See, e.g.,
Shawhan v. Wherritt, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 627, 630 (1849).
120. Simonson v. Granquist, 369 U.S. 38, 40 (1962). Although the United States has had
many Bankruptcy Acts on the books, the Act of 1898 lasted the longest, enduring eighty years, until
it was replaced by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See, e.g., I COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 1.01
(15th ed., rev. 2007) ("Until the enactment of the [1978] Code, the bankruptcy law was contained in
the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Prior to 1898, there was no bankruptcy law that had been continuously
in effect during the life of the United States." (citation omitted)); David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of
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Code endeavors to relieve debtors of their outstanding debts and permit
them to reorganize their affairs on the way to a fresh start.2 '
Including fraudulently transferred property within § 541 prior to its re-
covery would appear to advance the Bankruptcy Code's distributional
purpose by facilitating equitable distribution of the debtor's assets.122 How-
ever, such a determination fails to do so efficiently. Allowing the debtor to
retain any interest in purportedly fraudulently transferred property prior to
its recovery creates uncertainty in the bankruptcy process. For example, if
courts were to consider allegedly fraudulently transferred property as property
of the estate prior to its recovery, the trustee could use a turnover action under
§ 542-which requires holders of the debtor's property to "deliver to the trus-
tee, and account for, such property or the value of such property"_23-and
thereby avoid the two-year statute of limitations for actions to recover
fraudulently transferred property under § 548 1 4 or the one-year statute of
limitations under § 550.125 If a mere allegation of fraudulent transfer is suffi-
cient to include the property as property of the estate,126 the statute of
limitations under either § 548 or § 550 that limits the trustee's ability to act
has no force. Moreover, under the Fifth Circuit's approach, a trustee could
pull transferred property into the estate with a mere allegation of fraudulent
transfer, instead of having to prove the allegation first. Such a result would
potentially cloud the title of all property that the debtor has transferred
within the relevant period-and make the results of the bankruptcy petition
uncertain-until a court determined that each transfer was not fraudulent.' 7
Creating clouds on title in this manner also thwarts the second goal of
bankruptcy: it denies debtors fresh starts. Despite the Fifth Circuit's inten-
tions to help creditors, the uncertainty that cloudy titles can cause regarding
the final results of a bankruptcy petition can render the process unnecessar-
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 321-22 (1999) ("For the first century of the na-
tion's existence, there had never been a stable bankruptcy law.... Congress passed the 1898 Act,
and the rest is history. The 1898 Act endured, and bankruptcy law has expanded-rather than con-
tracted or been repealed-ever since.").
121. See, e.g., Westmoreland, 246 F.3d at 251 (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462
U.S. 198, 203 (1983), and Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Cohn (In re Cohn), 54 F3d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir.
1995)).
122. See Am. Nat'l Bank of Austin v. MortgageAmerica Corp. (In re MortgageAmerica
Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266, 1275 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that when a "debtor has fraudulently trans-
ferred [property] in an effort to put it out of the reach of creditors ... it makes the most sense to
consider the debtor as continuing to have a 'legal or equitable interest[]' in the property" under
§ 541(a)(1)).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2000).
124. In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 542,
544, 546(a), 548; supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text. This interpretation also violates the
rule against surplusage by obviating § 548. For more on the rule against surplusage, see supra Sec-
tion lI.B.
125. See supra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
127. In re Saunders, 101 B.R. at 305.
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ily long for the debtors seeking a clean slate. 28 This uncertainty can also
leave creditors in a more precarious position than they otherwise would have
been. 29 Creditors will likely react to this increased uncertainty with in-
creased litigation over the bankruptcy matter, dragging out the process and
denying the debtors their fresh start.
In re BFP"3 ° is a prime example of a bankruptcy case that would have
benefited from certainty of title. This case reached the U.S. Supreme Court
because a quiet title action was not resolved prior to the property's disposi-
tion."' In In re BFP, a pair of homeowners conveyed a single piece of
property to two entities: investment partnership BFP and Off-Road Vehi-
cles-Recreation & Family Campground, Inc. ("Off-Road").'32 As a result,
BFP and its partners brought suit against Off-Road in state court to quiet
title."' Meanwhile, the mortgage holder on the property, Imperial, moved to
foreclose, prompting Off-Road to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition
against BFP.34 The bankruptcy stayed the foreclosure, but the court subse-
quently granted both BFP's motion to dismiss the involuntary petition and
Imperial's motion to lift the stay.'35 The property was sold in foreclosure
proceedings.136 Three months after the foreclosure sale, the quiet title action
was settled in Imperial's favor. 33 BFP then filed a voluntary Chapter 11
bankruptcy petition and sought to nullify the foreclosure sale as a transfer
for less than reasonably equivalent value under § 548(a)(2). 138
While the Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appellate Panel upheld Imperial's
foreclosure sale because BFP "failed to show that the bankruptcy court erred
in concluding that reasonably equivalent value was given for the subject
property,"'' 39 the difficulties that took In re BFP from a California bankruptcy
court to the U.S. Supreme Court'4° stemmed from the fact that the court did
128. See, e.g., BFP v. Imperial Sav. & Loan Ass'n (In re BFP), 132 B.R. 748 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1991), aff'd, 974 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1992), aff'd sub nom. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S.
531 (1994). BFP's fresh start took at least five years to obtain, with BFP stuck in involuntary bank-
ruptcy from at least June 1989 to June 1994, when the Supreme Court denied the petitioner's
request for rehearing. Id.
129. See id. (subjecting a lender to a five-year lawsuit regarding whether a foreclosure sale
was valid).
130. Id.
131. Id. at749.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 751. The court's holding meant the sale did not qualify for avoidance as a fraudu-
lent transfer under § 548 because the absence of "reasonably equivalent value" is required in order
to maintain the action.
140. BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531 (1994).
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not resolve the quiet title action prior to the disposition of the collateral. If
the court had settled title in the lender prior to the property's sale in foreclo-
sure, there would have been little to no question whether the lender in BFP
had the right to dispose of the collateral. This certainty would have allowed
the bankruptcy proceeding to be resolved much faster, equitably distributing
the property and providing the debtors with their fresh start much more effi-
ciently.
Considering purportedly fraudulently transferred property as property of
the estate prior to its recovery would give rise to further instances of BFP-
like uncertainty because not all attempts to avoid fraudulent transfers will suc-
ceed.' 4' In fact, In re BFP is a prime example of a case where a fraudulent
conveyance action failed.142 The fact that the quiet title action in this case was
later resolved in the lender's favorn3-thereby affirming the preliminary de-
termination of the lower court--does not ameliorate the uncertainty prior to
such resolution. Because a court may later adjudge purportedly fraudulently
transferred property as having been validly transferred, the Fifth Circuit's
approach creates only temporary certainty regarding the disposition of the
property. Until the court finally resolves the issue of ownership and allega-
tions of fraudulent transfer, its initial determination remains speculative.
By considering purportedly fraudulently transferred property as property
of the estate prior to adjudication, the court skips a necessary step and
leaves bankruptcy proceedings open to potentially lengthy appeals. Such
lengthy litigation and appeals would overburden courts, a result not likely
contemplated by Congress.' 4 For example, although BFP was only a small,
three-partner company, it still took over five years to reach final adjudication
on this matter. 45 Bankruptcies involving larger companies with greater as-
141. See, e.g., id. at 545 (denying avoidance under § 548); see also Granfinanciera, S. A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 49 (1989) (holding that the Seventh Amendment guarantees a jury upon
request in fraudulent conveyance actions where the petitioner "plainly seeks relief traditionally
provided by law courts or on the law side of courts having both legal and equitable dockets"). The
right to a jury trial established in Granfinanciera demonstrates a potential for uncertainty in this
arena.
142. BFP, 511 U.S. at 545 (deeming that "a fair and proper price, or a 'reasonably equivalent
value,' for foreclosed property, is the price in fact received at the foreclosure sale, so long as all the
requirements of the State's foreclosure law have been complied with" and that, therefore, the fore-
closure sale in question does not fall under § 548).
143. In re BFP, 132 B.R. at 749.
144. See, e.g., In re Saunders, 101 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1989). The In re Saunders
court reasoned that Congress did not intend to include fraudulently transferred property as property
of the estate prior to adjudication:
We think that the inclusion of property recovered by the trustee pursuant to his avoidance
powers in a separate definitional subparagraph clearly reflects the congressional intent that
such property is not to be considered property of the estate until it is recovered .... If it were,
the trustee could simply use a turnover action under 11 U.S.C. § 542, and the two (2) year stat-
ute of limitations of § 546(a) for actions under §§ 544 and 548 could be avoided.... This
result was clearly not contemplated by Congress.
Id.
145. In re BFP, 132 B.R. at 748. While the original filing date of the involuntary bankruptcy
petition does not appear in any of the reported cases, the Ninth Circuit's Bankruptcy Appeals Panel
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sets would likely take even longer to resolve. As the Supreme Court has
noted, "[b]ankruptcy courts would understandably be reluctant to encourage
a policy that would contribute to the overburdening of the bankruptcy court
system."'4 6 While some appeals are inevitable, the overburdening caused by
overstimulating the appellate process would hamper the bankruptcy courts'
efforts to efficiently and equitably distribute the debtors' property and to
provide debtors with a fresh start.
141
CONCLUSION
Courts should adopt the Second Circuit's approach to "property of the
estate" and hold that § 541 does not include fraudulently transferred prop-
erty that the trustee has yet to recover from a third party. Canons of
construction indicate that fraudulently transferred property is property of the
estate only once the trustee has recovered it. Moreover, although the Fifth
Circuit's approach to "property of the estate" attempts to equitably protect
creditors, including fraudulently transferred property as "property of the
estate" prior to its recovery potentially clouds title to property of the estate.
Such a result is problematic in terms of administration of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings and contravenes bankruptcy's twin goals of giving the debtor a
fresh start and efficiently and equitably distributing the debtor's property to
its creditors.
noted that the original bankruptcy stay was lifted on June 14, 1989 and that the foreclosure sale took
place July 12, 1989. Id. at 749.
146. Taylor v. Freeland and Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 649 n.4 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. To reduce the bankruptcy courts' burden, Congress recently implemented the Bankruptcy
Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, which requires that consumers first go
through credit counseling before being eligible for bankruptcy and reduces the scope of bankruptcy
relief. American Bankruptcy Institute, Bankruptcy Filings Increase 66 Percent over First Quarter
2006, June 27, 2007, http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=/
CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=47794 (last visited Feb. 16, 2008). The American Bank-
ruptcy Institute noted the following:
While representing an increase over the first quarter 2006 totals, the 2007 first quarter filings
are still below the 341,662 first quarter filing average recorded since 1997. This filing shortfall
reflects the changes brought about by the implementation of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA).
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